

**SECRET**

64-2289/A

6 April 1964

**Maj. Gen. Edgar C. Doleman**  
**Assistant Chief of Staff**  
**for Intelligence**  
**Department of the Army**  
**Washington, D. C. 20310**

**Dear General Doleman:**

This is in response to your letter to General Carter of 30 March concerning the U. S. Defector Program. I believe that most of the matters referred to in your letter have been affected by the action of the USIB on 2 April, which, I believe, is in the direction in which you are anxious for matters to proceed.

We will continue to follow this matter closely and I will be in touch with you.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

**Lyman B. Kirkpatrick**  
**Executive Director**

LBK:drm

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Army  
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ACSI-CX

14 FEB 1964

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505  
Attention: Deputy Director

Dear General Carter:

I should like to call to your attention the confusion within the U. S. Defector Program which I believe has been generated as a result of the 1 August 1962 ruling of the United States Intelligence Board, that "in the future the handling of defectors from an opposition foreign intelligence service should be discussed in an executive session of the USIB."

I did not, of course, participate in the August 1962 discussions; however, a review of the cases since then has convinced me that insufficient guidance was provided those who must become involved in the handling, exploitation, and resettlement of intelligence defectors. More important, the action taken in 1962 by-passed an already existing and working mechanism, the Interagency Defector Committee.

At the 14 February 1964 meeting of the IDC my representative offered a set of procedures for the handling of intelligence defectors for the discussion of the Committee. I feel that such action clearly falls within the functions of the IDC established in paragraph 2 of

During the recent 23 March 1964 IDC meeting the various members agreed that procedures were required, but, except for Army and DIA, felt that USIB had preempted the IDC's responsibility in such cases. The DIA member abstained from voting.

The current case of the Polish code clerk defector from the United Nations was also broached by the Army member during the 23 March 1964 meeting. Previous to the meeting the FBI member had stated that the FBI would be ready to turn this source over to the Defector Committee in about two weeks for exploitation on behalf of the community.

I was quite surprised to learn that during the above meeting, the Chairman of the IDC took the position that since USIB had not indicated how this case was to be handled, he, the Chairman, could not then accept

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General Carter

this case. The Army member concurred in the FBI position that there was no reason why the case could not be accepted by the Committee. The other members (DIA abstained from voting) agreed that the Chairman should seek a position from USIB.

In the meantime, based on the FBI report concerning the Polish code clerk, both the Army Security Agency and the Army counterintelligence production section have indicated extreme interest in debriefing this source. Undoubtedly other Defense requirements will be generated as more information becomes available concerning this source's knowledge-ability. The DIA member of the IDC has indicated his intention to recommend that Army undertake the debriefing of this source and, if requested to do so, my office will accept this responsibility. This action must now be held in abeyance pending a USIB ruling.

I feel that the above confusion is a natural result of our failure to use the IDC for the purpose for which it was established. I recommend that the 1 August 1962 ruling be abrogated. The IDC is an extension of USIB and if any member feels that there are insufficient safeguards within the present defector directives to deal with the special aspects of intelligence defectors, I believe he should use his membership or entree to the IDC to introduce within that Committee what he feels to be the required changes.

I also recommend that the Polish code clerk be referred to the IDC for exploitation on behalf of the intelligence community as soon as the FBI makes him available.

The above actions will use the IDC to perform the functions assigned to it and remove the necessity for the USIB membership to concern itself with operational details and reports regarding every case of defection from hostile intelligence. They will also be in line with Mr. McGone's letter of 28 January 1964 which, in response to State's request for a review of defector handling procedures within the United States, indicated that State's recommendations would be referred to the Inter-agency Defector Committee. I believe that a continuing application of this principle will work to everyone's benefit. I am sending a copy of this letter to the interested members of the community.

Sincerely,

(S) Edgar C. Dolman

EDGAR C. DOLEMAN  
Major General, GS  
ACofS for Intelligence

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Duplication  
NSA has  
need all  
info  
and  
already  
prepared  
questions  
for the  
FBI

\* This copied from note  
made (presumably)  
by [redacted]  
on the original.

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